At this time six or seven of Harland’s division were on the weather bow of the Victory, to windward (westward), but a little ahead, and standing like her after the French; all on the port tack (Fig. 2).  None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flagship at once.  At 2.30 Palliser’s ship, the Formidable (R), on the starboard tack, passed the Victory to leeward, apparently the last of the fleet out of action.  A half-hour after this the Victory had been joined by three of the centre, which were following her in close order, the van remaining in the same relative position.  Astern of these two groups from van and centre were a number of other ships in various degrees of confusion,—­some going about, some trying to come up, others completely disabled.  Especially, there was in the south-south-east, therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels, evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.

This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral, scanning the field as the smoke drove away.  The disorder of the British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated in the conditions just described.  It was an inevitable result of a military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped.  The French, starting from a better formation, had come out in better shape.  But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the disadvantage of a policy essentially defensive; and d’Orvilliers’ next order, though well conceived, was resultless.  At 1 P.M.[49] he signalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle on the starboard tack (Fig. 2, F).  This signal was not seen by the leading ship, which should have begun the movement.  The junior French admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went about, and spoke the flagship, to know what was the Commander-in-Chief’s desire.  D’Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along the enemy’s fleet from end to end, to leeward, because in its disordered state there was a fair promise of advantage, and by going to leeward—­presenting his weather side to the enemy—­he could use the weather lower-deck guns, whereas, in the then state of the sea, the lee lower ports could not be opened.  Thus explained, the movement was executed, but the favourable moment had passed.  It was not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre was evident to the British.

[Illustration]

As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent’s intention, he wore the Victory again, (d), a few minutes after 3 P.M., and stood slowly down, on the starboard tack off the wind, towards his crippled ships in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of battle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station (Fig. 3, C).  As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy, (F), Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon