the opposing fleets surged by under short canvas, (D), firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy, and caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside.  “The distance between the Formidable, 90, (Palliser’s flagship) and the Egmont, 74, was so short,” testified Captain John Laforey, whose three-decker, the Ocean, 90, was abreast and outside this interval, “that it was with difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage, without firing upon them, and I was once very near on board the Egmont,”—­next ahead of the Ocean.  The Formidable kept her mizzen topsail aback much of the time, to deaden her way, to make the needed room ahead for the Ocean, and also to allow the rear ships to close.  “At a quarter past one,” testified Captain Maitland of the Elizabeth, 74, “we were very close behind the Formidable, and a midshipman upon the poop called out that there was a ship coming on board on the weatherbow.  I put the helm up,... and found, when the smoke cleared away, I was shot up under the Formidable’s lee.  She was then engaged with the two last ships in the French fleet, and, as I could not fire at them without firing through the Formidable, I was obliged to shoot on."[47] Captain Bazely, of the Formidable, says of the same incident, “The Formidable did at the time of action bear up to one of the enemy’s ships, to avoid being aboard of her, whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the Formidable.  I thought we could not avoid being on board.”

Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in killed and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of the two others.[48] This was due to the morning signal to chase to windward, which brought these ships closer than their leaders.  As soon as the British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel’s wishes, signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 2, V).  As the French column was running free, these ships, when about, fetched to windward of its wake.  When the Victory drew out of the fire, at 1 P.M., Keppel also made a similar signal, and attempted to wear (c), the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking; but caution was needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it was not till 2 P.M., that the Victory was about on the other tack (Fig. 2, C), heading after the French.  At this time, 2 P.M., just before or just after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down, and that for the line of battle was hoisted.  The object of the latter was to re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly because no longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict the urgent call for a re-formation.