of a partly executed manoeuvre (CC).  Their admiral had doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and from the direction of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter could not be avoided.  If he continued on the starboard tack, the van of the pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be misunderstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of them as he might choose.  By resuming the port tack, the heads of the columns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, on equal terms as regarded position; because all the French would engage, and not only a part of their rear.  Therefore he had ordered his ships to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again rapidly, but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.

[Illustration]

Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did he now.  Recognising from the four days’ chase that his enemy was avoiding action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at some risk.  It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade.  Besides, thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to chase, these, forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he was advancing, were now well to windward, able therefore to support their comrades, if needful, as well as to attack the enemy.  In short, practically the whole force was coming into action, although much less regularly than might have been desired.  What was to follow was a rough-and-ready fight, but it was all that could be had, and better than nothing.  Keppel therefore simply made the signal for battle, and that just as the firing began.  The collision was so sudden that the ships at first had not their colours flying.

The French also, although their manoeuvres had been more methodical, were in some confusion.  It is not given to a body of thirty ships, of varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement in a fortnight of sea practice.  The change of wind had precipitated an action, which one admiral had been seeking, and the other shunning; but each had to meet it with such shift as he could.  The British (CC) being close-hauled, the French (CC), advancing on a parallel line, were four points[45] off the wind.  Most of their ships, therefore, could have gone clear to windward of their opponents, but the fact that the latter could reach some of the leaders compelled the others to support them.  As d’Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an enemy resolute to fight.  The leading three French vessels[46] (e) hauled their wind, in obedience to the admiral’s signal to form the line of battle, which means a close-hauled line.  The effect of this was to draw them gradually away from the hostile line, taking them out of range of the British centre and rear.  This, if imitated by their followers, would render the affair even more partial and indecisive than such passing by usually was.  The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire soon after eleven.  The vessels of