it the stigma of flight,—­a preposterous extravagancy.  Harland put his division about at once and joined the Admiral.  On this tack his station was ahead of the Victory, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in behind her, to cover the rear until Palliser’s division could repair damage and take their places.  At 4 P.M.  Harland’s division was in the line.  Palliser’s ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves before or behind his flagship; their captains considering, as they testified, that they took station from their divisional commander, and not from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief.  There was formed thus, on the weather quarter of the Victory, and a mile or two distant, a separate line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of the fleet, and dependent for initiative on Palliser’s flagship (Fig. 3, R).  At 5 P.M.  Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten into the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the French now having completed their manoeuvre.  They had not attacked, as they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee of the British, their van abreast the latter’s centre.  At the same time Harland was directed to move to his proper position in the van, which he at once did (Fig. 3, V).  Palliser made no movement, and Keppel with extraordinary—­if not culpable—­forbearance refrained from summoning the rear ships into line by their individual pennants.  This he at last did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then grouped with Palliser, (except his own flagship), to leave the latter and take their posts in the line.  This was accordingly done, but it was thought then to be too late to renew the action.  At daylight the next morning, only three French ships were in sight from the decks; but the main body could be seen in the south-east from some of the mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to twenty miles distant.

Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish; the British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the French 161 killed and 513 wounded.  The general result would appear to indicate that the French, in accordance with their usual policy, had fired to cripple their enemy’s spars and rigging, the motive-power.  This would be consistent with d’Orvilliers’ avowed purpose of avoiding action except under favourable circumstances.  As the smoke thickened and confusion increased, the fleets had got closer together, and, whatever the intention, many shot found their way to the British hulls.  Nevertheless, as the returns show, the number of men hit among the French was to the British nearly as 7 to 5.  On the other hand, it is certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the action was greater than that of the British.