are to be considered as ‘explained,’ i.e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine.  As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt.  Such common arguments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped ‘otherwise’ (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on.

13.  If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versa) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.—­Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge[276]).  Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite[277].—­Hence Scripture cannot be acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge.  And if you ask, ’Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?’ we give you the following instance.  The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment.  Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment.  The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa.  Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman.  But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred.  The doctrine of Brahman’s causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.