on accomplished actually existing things; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, ‘fire is hot.’  Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men’s opinions is impossible.  But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third.  How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?—­Nor can it be said that he who maintains the pradhana to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sa@nkhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.—­Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge.  The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future.  We have thus established the perfection of this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to ’absence of final release’ of the transmigrating souls.  Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.

12.  Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.

Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedanta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradhana being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.—­But now some dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine.  The Sutrakara, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished.  Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by either Manu or Vyasa or other authorities,