To the preceding objection we reply, ’It may exist as in ordinary experience.’  Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances.  We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c.  From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea.  So it is in the case under discussion also.  The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman.  And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, ’Having created he entered into it,’ Taitt.  Up.  II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts.  The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.

14.  The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as ‘origin’ and the like.

The[278] refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged.  In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect.  The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman.  Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has no existence apart from the cause.—­How so?—­’On account of the scriptural word “origin” and others.’  The word ‘origin’ is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing everthing is known; viz.  Ch.  Up.  VI, 1, 4, ’As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; thus,’ &c.—­The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay[279], there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature.  For these modifications