Sec.38. Eripitur:  cf. 30. Neque sentire:  Christ om. neque; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. Cedere:  cf. [Greek:  eikein, eixis] in Sext. P.H. I. 193, 230, Diog.  VII. 51, [Greek:  ton de aisthetikon meta eixeos kai synkatatheseos ginontai [hai phantasia]]; also 66 of this book. [Greek:  Oikeion]:  cf. 34. Adsentitur statim:  this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20. Memoriam:  cf. 22. In nostra potestate:  this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the Ac.  Post., which see.

Sec.39. Virtus:  even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. Ante videri aliquid for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of videri, n. on 25. Adsentiatur:  the passive use is illustrated by Madv. Em. 131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after necesse est on D.F. V. 25. Tollit e vita:  so De Fato 29.

Sec.Sec.40—­42.  Summary.  The Academics have a regular method.  They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different classes of sensations.  Then they put forward their two strong arguments, (1) things which produce sensations such as might have been produced in the same form by other things, cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) sensations must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to distinguish between them.  Then they proceed.  Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real perceptions, while the true are always of a form which the false may assume.  Now sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.  There is therefore no sensation which is also a perception (40).  Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.  The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an unreality (41).  To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either class (42). [The word “perception” is used to mean “a certainly known sensation.”]

Sec.40. Quasi fundamenta:  a trans. probably of [Greek:  themelios] or the like; cf. [Greek:  hosper themelios] in Sext. A.M. V. 50. Artem:  method, like [Greek:  techne], cf. M.D.F. III. 4, Mayor on Iuv.  VII. 177. Vim:  the general character which attaches to all [Greek:  phantasiai]; genera the different classes of