in regular order to the others with which it was deemed proper to endow it, all, too, drawn with the utmost circumspection and care.  How much more consistent is this construction with the great objects of the institution and with the high character of the enlightened and patriotic citizens who framed it, as well as of those who ratified it, than one which subverts every sound principle and rule of construction and throws everything into confusion.

I have dwelt thus long on this part of the subject from an earnest desire to fix in a clear and satisfactory manner the import of the second part of this grant, well knowing from the generality of the terms used their tendency to lead into error.  I indulge a strong hope that the view herein presented will not be without effect, but will tend to satisfy the unprejudiced and impartial that nothing more was granted by that part than a power to appropriate the public money raised under the other part.  To what extent that power may be carried will be the next object of inquiry.

It is contended on the one side that as the National Government is a government of limited powers it has no right to expend money except in the performance of acts authorized by the other specific grants according to a strict construction of their powers; that this grant in neither of its branches gives to Congress discretionary power of any kind, but is a mere instrument in its hands to carry into effect the powers contained in the other grants.  To this construction I was inclined in the more early stage of our Government; but on further reflection and observation my mind has undergone a change, for reasons which I will frankly unfold.

The grant consists, as heretofore observed, of a twofold power—­the first to raise, the second to appropriate, the public money—­and the terms used in both instances are general and unqualified.  Bach branch was obviously drawn with a view to the other, and the import of each tends to illustrate that of the other.  The grant to raise money gives a power over every subject from which revenue may be drawn, and is made in the same manner with the grants to declare war, to raise and support armies and a navy, to regulate commerce, to establish post-offices and post-roads, and with all the other specific grants to the General Government.  In the discharge of the powers contained in any of these grants there is no other check than that which is to be found in the great principles of our system, the responsibility of the representative to his constituents.  If war, for example, is necessary, and Congress declare it for good cause, their constituents will support them in it.  A like support will be given them for the faithful discharge of their duties under any and every other power vested in the United States.  It affords to the friends of our free governments the most heartfelt consolation to know—­and from the best evidence, our own experience—­that in great emergencies the boldest measures, such as