take power from the States or in any sense in which power can be controverted, or become a question between the two Governments.  The application of money raised under a lawful power is a right or grant which may be abused.  It may be applied partially among the States, or to improper purposes in our foreign and domestic concerns; but still it is a power not felt in the sense of other power, since the only complaint which any State can make of such partiality and abuse is that some other State or States have obtained greater benefit from the application than by a just rule of apportionment they were entitled to.  The right of appropriation is therefore from its nature secondary and incidental to the right of raising money, and it was proper to place it in the same grant and same clause with that right.  By rinding them, then, in that order we see a new proof of the sense in which the grant was made, corresponding with the view herein taken of it.

The last part of this grant, which provides that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, furnishes another strong proof that it was not intended that the second part should constitute a distinct grant in the sense above stated, or convey any other right than that of appropriation.  This provision operates exclusively on the power granted in the first part of the clause.  It recites three branches of that power—­duties, imposts, and excises—­those only on which it could operate, the rule by which the fourth—­that is, taxes—­should be laid being already provided for in another part of the Constitution.  The object of this provision is to secure a just equality among the States in the exercise of that power by Congress.  By placing it after both the grants—­that is, after that to raise and that to appropriate the public money—­and making it apply to the first only it shows that it was not intended that the power granted in the second should be paramount to and destroy that granted in the first.  It shows also that no such formidable power as that suggested had been granted in the second, or any power against the abuse of which it was thought necessary specially to provide.  Surely if it was deemed proper to guard a specific power of limited extent and well-known import against injustice and abuse, it would have been much more so to have guarded against the abuse of a power of such vast extent and so indefinite as would have been granted by the second part of the clause if considered as a distinct and original grant.

With this construction all the other enumerated grants, and, indeed, all the grants of power contained in the Constitution, have their full operation and effect.  They all stand well together, fulfilling the great purposes intended by them.  Under it we behold a great scheme, consistent in all its parts, a Government instituted for national purposes, vested with adequate powers for those purposes, commencing with the most important of all, that of the revenue, and proceeding