form the strongest appeals to the virtue and patriotism of the people, are sure to obtain the most decided approbation.  But should the representative act corruptly and betray his trust, or otherwise prove that he was unworthy of the confidence of his constituents, he would be equally sure to lose it and to be removed and otherwise censured, according to his deserts.  The power to raise money by taxes, duties, imposts, and excises is alike unqualified, nor do I see any check on the exercise of it other than that which applies to the other powers above recited, the responsibility of the representative to his constituents.  Congress know the extent of the public engagements and the sums necessary to meet them; they know how much may be derived from each branch of revenue without pressing it too far; and, paying due regard to the interests of the people, they likewise know which branch ought to be resorted to in the first instance.  From the commencement of the Government two branches of this power, duties and imposts, have been in constant operation, the revenue from which has supported the Government in its various branches and met its other ordinary engagements.  In great emergencies the other two, taxes and excises, have likewise been resorted to, and neither was the right or the policy ever called in question.

If we look to the second branch of this power, that which authorizes the appropriation of the money thus raised, we find that it is not less general and unqualified than the power to raise it.  More comprehensive terms than to “pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare” could not have been used.  So intimately connected with and dependent on each other are these two branches of power that had either been limited the limitation would have had the like effect on the other.  Had the power to raise money been conditional or restricted to special purposes, the appropriation must have corresponded with it, for none but the money raised could be appropriated, nor could it be appropriated to other purposes than those which were permitted.  On the other hand, if the right of appropriation had been restricted to certain purposes, it would be useless and improper to raise more than would be adequate to those purposes.  It may fairly be inferred these restraints or checks have been carefully and intentionally avoided.  The power in each branch is alike broad and unqualified, and each is drawn with peculiar fitness to the other, the latter requiring terms of great extent and force to accommodate the former, which have been adopted, and both placed in the same clause and sentence.

Can it be presumed that all these circumstances were so nicely adjusted by mere accident?  Is it not more just to conclude that they were the result of due deliberation and design?  Had it been intended that Congress should be restricted in the appropriation of the public money to such expenditures as were authorized by a rigid construction of the other specific grants, how easy would it have been to have provided for it by a declaration to that effect.  The omission of such declaration is therefore an additional proof that it was not intended that the grant should be so construed.