Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France:  the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most emphatic steps.

[Sidenote:  see exhibit 12.]

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship.  We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria’s declining it, as was to be expected.

[Sidenote:  see exhibit 13.]

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an understanding between these two powers.

[Sidenote:  see exhibits 15 & 16.]

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey’s to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations.  The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened.

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy.

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.

[Sidenote:  see exhibit 17.]

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized.  At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows: 

“The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia.  I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible.  Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which
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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.