Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

[Sidenote:  see exhibits 4 & 5.]

The Russian Government submitted an official communique on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict.  The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th.  The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers.  After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.

[Sidenote:  see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]

The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in the evening.

[Sidenote:  see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilization.  The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government: 

    “Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
    counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

    “But mobilization means war.

“As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France.  We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.  Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting.  We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter.  It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding.”

[Sidenote:  see exhibit 11.]

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the German military attache his word of honor that no order to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in.  If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e.  Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e.  St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw.  Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats.  The military attache then pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate.  Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.