Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).
Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty.  Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,—­a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war—­should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone.  There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.
“I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

    “It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia
    could not now be deserted by Russia”.

On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army: 

“The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty.  He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago.  He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i.e. 3 o’clock in the afternoon.  He could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.
“As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle.  On his officers word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

    “I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to
    the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant
    and positive information about the calling in of reserves.”

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg.  The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sasonow.  Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

[Sidenote:  see exhibit 19.]

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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.