we call asceticism, and an undue subordination of self to others.  It is, then the organizing or harmonizing principle, subordinating the interests of each aspect of the self, and of the many conflicting selves, to the total welfare of the individual and of the community.  As Plato pointed out, [Footnote:  Republic, books.  I-iv; e.g. (444):  “Is not the creation of righteousness the creation of a natural order and government of one another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of unrighteousness the opposite?” and (352):  “Is not unrighteousness equally suicidal when existing in an individual [as it is when it exists in the State], rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, making him an enemy to himself?” and (443):  “The righteous man does not permit the several elements within him to meddle with one another, or any of them to do the work of others; but he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master, and at peace with himself; and when ... he is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he will think and call right and good action that which preserves and cooperates with this condition.” (In quoting Plato I have used Jowett’s translation, with an occasional substitution; as, above, in the use of “righteousness” and “right” instead of “justice” and “just.")] representative of all other interests, the consensus of interest.  Such a definition, we must admit, happily describes morality, showing us that if we would find its leading we must know ourselves; we must examine our actual existing needs and consider how best to attain them.  The direction of morality is that of a carefully pruned and weeded human nature.  But there are certain dangers inherent in this form of definition which we must note: 

(1) We must not be satisfied with the synthesis of consciously felt desires.  Many of our deepest needs fail to come to the surface and embody themselves in impulses; we do not know or seek what is really best for ourselves.  There are possibilities of harmony and peace upon low levels.  We must be pricked into desire for new forms of life and not allowed to stagnate in a condition which, however well organized and contented, is lacking in the richness and joy we might attain.  We must include in the “interests” to be organized all our dumb and unrealized needs, all potential and latent impulses, as well as our articulate desires.

(2) On the other hand, there are perverse and pathological impulses which are deserving of no regard and must be simply cast aside in the organizing process, because they lead only to unhappiness.  There is a difference between the desirable and the desired; morality is not merely an organizing but a corrective force, bringing sometimes not peace but a sword.  A truer figure would be to represent it as a flowers and ruthlessly pruning or weeding out others, that the garden may be the most beautiful place.