to obey them.  Experience alone can be judge; the experience of the beneficence of the Christian ideal.  The Way of Life that Christ taught verifies itself when tried; that it is the supreme ideal for man is proved by the transfiguration of life it effects.  Christ and the Bible deserve our allegiance because they are worthy of it; from them we can learn the secrets of man’s true welfare.  Morality is, indeed, older than religion.  It develops to a certain point, and in some cases very highly, without the concept of God.  It has an and needs no supernatural prop.  Religion is not the root of morality, but its flower and consummation.  The finest ideals, the loftiest heights of morality, merge into religion; but even these spiritual ideals have their ultimate root in the common soil of human welfare, and are rational ideals because they minister to human need.

For the “categorical” theory of morality, see Kant’s Theory of Ethics, trans.  Abbott; F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies; F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book ii, chap, V, secs. 3 and 4; Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap, XVI, sec. 2; H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chap, iii, sees. 12, 13.  W. Fite, Introductory Study of Ethics, chap.  X. H. Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil, book I, chap.  V. For the “according to nature” theory, see Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, passim; Rousseau, Discourse on Science and Art, etc.; J. S. Mill, “Nature” in Three Essays on Religion; T.H.  Huxley, Evolution and Ethics.  T. N. Carver, The Religion Worth Having.  For the “self-realization” theory, see T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics; F. Paulsen, op. cit, esp. book ii, chap, ii, secs. 5-8; H. W. Wright, Self-Realization; J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 2d ed, chaps, vi and vii.  W. Fite, op. cit, chap.  XI.  For theological ethics, see any of the older theological books.  A brief comment may be found in H. Spencer’s Data of Ethics, chap, iv, sec. 18.

CHAPTER XIV

THE WORTH OF MORALITY

Before proceeding to a more concrete unfolding of the difficulties and problems of morality, it will be well to formulate our theory in terms of modern biology, and then, finally, to answer those modern critics who reject not merely the rational explanation of morality but morality itself.

Morality as the organization of human interests.

The worth of morality is most commonly defended today, in biological terms, by describing it as a synthesis of human interests; it is valuable because it is what we really want and need.  It does, indeed, forbid the carrying-out of any impulse which renders impossible greater goods; it flatly opposes that unrestrained satisfying of a part of our natures which we call self-indulgence, or of one nature at the expense of others which we call selfishness.  But it stifles desire only for a greater ultimate good; it rejects that needless repression of a part of the self which