This contrast is no fancy picture.  The experiment of conducting the administration of a public department by an independent unsheltered authority has often been tried, and always failed.  Parliament always poked at it, till it made it impossible.  The most remarkable is that of the Poor Law.  The administration of that law is not now very good, but it is not too much to say that almost the whole of its goodness has been preserved by its having an official and party protector in the House of Commons.  Without that contrivance we should have drifted back into the errors of the old Poor Law, and superadded to them the present meanness and incompetence in our large towns.  All would have been given up to local management.  Parliament would have interfered with the central board till it made it impotent, and the local authorities would have been despotic.  The first administration of the new Poor Law was by “Commissioners”—­the three kings of Somerset House, as they were called.  The system was certainly not tried in untrustworthy hands.  At the crisis Mr. Chadwick, one of the most active and best administrators in England, was the secretary and the motive power:  the principal Commissioner was Sir George Lewis, perhaps the best selective administrator of our time.  But the House of Commons would not let the Commission alone.  For a long time it was defended because the Whigs had made the Commission, and felt bound as a party to protect it.  The new law started upon a certain intellectual impetus, and till that was spent its administration was supported in a rickety existence by an abnormal strength.  But afterwards the Commissioners were left to their intrinsic weakness.  There were members for all the localities, but there were none for them.  There were members for every crotchet and corrupt interest, but there were none for them.  The rural guardians would have liked to eke out wages by rates; the city guardians hated control, and hated to spend money.  The Commission had to be dissolved, and a Parliamentary head was added; the result is not perfect, but it is an amazing improvement on what would have happened in the old system.  The new system has not worked well because the central authority has too little power; but under the previous system the central authority was getting to have, and by this time would have had, no power at all.  And if Sir George Lewis and Mr. Chadwick could not maintain an outlying department in the face of Parliament, how unlikely that an inferior compound of discretion and activity will ever maintain it!

These reasonings show why a changing Parliamentary head, a head changing as the Ministry changes, is a necessity of good Parliamentary government, and there is happily a natural provision that there will be such heads.  Party organisation ensures it.  In America, where on account of the fixedly recurring presidential election, and the perpetual minor elections, party organisation is much more effectually organised