But we should be doing Diogenes an injustice, if we set him down as a mere discontented misanthrope. In giving due weight to unworthy motives, we have looked only at one side—and that the worst—of his character. His mind was of an inquiring speculative cast, and in youth he aspired to join the disciples of Zeno. So persistent indeed was he that the stoic, unwilling to have such a questionable pupil, one day forgot his serene philosophy, and set upon him with a cudgel. Such arguments did not tend to soften Diogenes’ disposition, and although he accused man of folly rather than malignity, he went so far to say that a man should have “reason or a rope.” He probably thought it easier than Democritus to follow wisdom, because he did not see quite so far. Still he showed that he took an interest in social life, and had he been less of a moralist, he would have had better claims to be regarded as a “wit” than any other character in Grecian history. Many examples could be adduced in which his principal object was evidently to be amusing:—
Entering a school in which he saw many statues of the Muses, but few pupils, “You have many scholars among the gods,” he said to the master. On being asked at what time it was proper to dine, “If you are rich, when you will; if poor, when you can,” he replied, perhaps a little sadly; and to “What wine do you like to drink?” he quickly responded “Another man’s.” Meeting one, Anaximenes, a very fat man, he called out, “Give us poor fellows some of your stomach; it will be a great relief to you, and an advantage to us.”
That Diogenes recognised humour as a means of drawing attention and impressing the memory, is shown by the story that on one occasion, when he was speaking seriously and found no one attending, he began to imitate the singing of birds, and when he had thus collected a crowd, told them they were ready to hear folly but not wisdom. There was also, probably, in adopting this form a desire to preclude the possibility of his being contradicted. He was thus proof against criticism—if his statements were said to be false—well, they were intended to be so; while, if they raised a laugh, there was an admission that they contained some seeds of truth. The following are examples of his disguised wisdom:—
On being asked when a man should marry, “A young man not yet; an old man not at all,” he replied. “Why men gave money to beggars and not to philosophers?” “Because they think they may themselves become blind and lame, but never philosophers.” When Perdiccas threatened that unless he came to him he would kill him, “You would do no great thing,” he replied, “even a beetle or a spider could do that.”