SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]

Whether Moral Virtue Differs from Intellectual Virtue?

Objection 1:  It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue.  For Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei iv, 21) “that virtue is the art of right conduct.”  But art is an intellectual virtue.  Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.

Obj. 2:  Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues:  thus some define perseverance as a “science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold”; and holiness as “a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God.”  Now science is an intellectual virtue.  Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3:  Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that “virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason.”  But this belongs to the intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13.  Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

Obj. 4:  Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition.  But intellectual virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue:  for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.”  Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13.  Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that “there are two kinds of virtue:  some we call intellectual; some moral.”

I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways.  For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever:  such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action.  Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that “the soul rules the body like a despot,” i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel.  Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way.  If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect.  Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues.  This was the opinion of Socrates, who said “every virtue is a kind of prudence,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 13.  Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.