Reply Obj. 1:  Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1:  and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above.  Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.

Reply Obj. 2:  A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal:  one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation.  And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses.  For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.

Reply Obj. 3:  Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 4):  and in this sense delight is called a passion. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether Delight Is in Time?

Objection 1:  It would seem that delight is in time.  For “delight is a kind of movement,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11).  But all movement is in time.  Therefore delight is in time.

Obj. 2:  Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time.  But some pleasures are called morose.  Therefore pleasure is in time.

Obj. 3:  Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus.  But some passions of the soul are in time.  Therefore delight is too.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “no one takes pleasure according to time.”

I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways:  first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were.  For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential:  such are movement, repose, speech and such like.  On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive.  Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten:  yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.