which they might gain by using persuasion as well as force, but trust to force only.  And I have something else to say about the matter.  Here have we been from early dawn until noon, discoursing about laws, and all that we have been saying is only the preamble of the laws which we are about to give.  I tell you this, because I want you to observe that songs and strains have all of them preludes, but that laws, though called by the same name (nomoi), have never any prelude.  Now I am disposed to give preludes to laws, dividing them into two parts—­one containing the despotic command, which I described under the image of the slave doctor—­the other the persuasive part, which I term the preamble.  The legislator should give preludes or preambles to his laws.  ‘That shall be the way in my colony.’  I am glad that you agree with me; this is a matter which it is important to remember.  A preamble is not always necessary to a law:  the lawgiver must determine when it is needed, as the musician determines when there is to be a prelude to a song.  ’Most true:  and now, having a preamble, let us recommence our discourse.’  Enough has been said of Gods and parents, and we may proceed to consider what relates to the citizens—­their souls, bodies, properties,—­their occupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education.

The first word of the Laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought which is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that Law is of divine origin.  In the words of a great English writer—­’Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.’  Though the particular laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim, this is not true of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of human nature, and not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment.  They have their natural divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue; very unlike the discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an English Parliament.  Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato’s treatment of the subject:  first, a lesser, inasmuch as he does not clearly distinguish the Cretan and Spartan laws, of which the exclusive aim is war, from those other laws of Zeus and Apollo which are said to be divine, and to comprehend all virtue.  Secondly, we may retort on him his own complaint against Sparta and Crete, that he has himself given us a code of laws, which for the most part have a military character; and that we cannot point to ’obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure;’ at least there is only one such, that which relates to the regulation of convivial intercourse.  The military spirit which is condemned by him in the beginning of the Laws, reappears in the seventh and eighth books.