and the traitor should die; and this was just, but the reverse of honourable.  In this way does the language of the many rend asunder the just and honourable.  ‘That is true.’  But is our own language consistent?  I have already said that the evil are involuntarily evil; and the evil are the unjust.  Now the voluntary cannot be the involuntary; and if you two come to me and say, ’Then shall we legislate for our city?’ Of course, I shall reply.—­’Then will you distinguish what crimes are voluntary and what involuntary, and shall we impose lighter penalties on the latter, and heavier on the former?  Or shall we refuse to determine what is the meaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain that our words have come down from heaven, and that they should be at once embodied in a law?’ All states legislate under the idea that there are two classes of actions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there is great confusion about them in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless they are distinguished.  Either we must abstain from affirming that unjust actions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement.  Believing, then, that acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other mode of classifying them.  Hurts are voluntary and involuntary, but all hurts are not injuries:  on the other hand, a benefit when wrongly conferred may be an injury.  An act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just; but the legislator who has to decide whether the case is one of hurt or injury, must consider the animus of the agent; and when there is hurt, he must as far as possible, provide a remedy and reparation:  but if there is injustice, he must, when compensation has been made, further endeavour to reconcile the two parties.  ‘Excellent.’  Where injustice, like disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word or deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and penalties, or any other influence which may inspire man with the love of justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of law.  But when the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will consider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself, and in two ways a good to society:  first, as he becomes an example to others; secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such a case, but in no other, the legislator will punish with death.  ’There is some truth in what you say.  I wish, however, that you would distinguish more clearly the difference of injury and hurt, and the complications of voluntary and involuntary.’  You will admit that anger is of a violent and destructive nature?  ‘Certainly.’  And further, that pleasure is different from anger, and has an opposite power, working by persuasion and deceit?  ‘Yes.’  Ignorance is the third source of crimes; this is of two kinds—­ simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit of knowledge; the latter, when