* The interpretation I have given to the sentiments of the Egyptian army follows clearly enough from the observation of Herodotus, that “the Egyptians, having never experienced themselves the power of the Greeks, had felt for them nothing but contempt.”  The site of Irasa and the fountain of Theste has been fixed with much probability in the fertile district watered still by the fountain of Ersen, Erazem, or Erasan.

This unexpected reverse was the occasion of the outbreak of a revolution which had been in preparation for years.  The emigration to Ethiopia of some contingents of the military class had temporarily weakened the factions hostile to foreign influence; these factions had felt themselves powerless under the rule of Psammetichus I., and had bowed to his will, prepared all the while to reassert themselves when they felt strong enough to do so successfully.  The reorganisation of the native army furnished them at once with the means of insurrection, of which they had temporarily been deprived.  Although Pharaoh had lavished privileges on the Hermotybies and Calasiries, she had not removed the causes for discontent which had little by little alienated the good will of the Mashauasha:  to do so would have rendered necessary the disbanding of the Ionian guard, the object of their jealousy, and to take this step neither he nor his successors could submit themselves.  The hatred of these mercenaries, and the irritation against the sovereigns who employed them, grew fiercer from reign to reign, and now wanted nothing but a pretext to break forth openly:  such a pretext was furnished by the defeat at Irasa.  When the fugitives arrived at the entrenched camp of Marea, exasperated by their defeat, and alleging doubtless that it was due to treachery, they found others who affected to share their belief that Pharaoh had despatched his Egyptian troops against Cyrene with the view of consigning to certain death those whose loyalty to him was suspected, and it was not difficult to stir up the disaffected soldiers to open revolt.  It was not the first time that a military tumult had threatened the sovereignty of Apries.  Some time previous to this, in an opposite quarter of the Nile valley, the troops stationed at Elephantine, composed partly of Egyptians, partly of Asiatic and Greek mercenaries—­possibly the same who had fought in the Ethiopian campaign under Psammetichus II.—­had risen in rebellion owing to some neglect in the payment of their wages:  having devastated the Thebaid, they had marched straight across the desert to the port of Shashirit, in the hope of there seizing ships to enable them to reach the havens of Idumaea or Nabatoa.  The governor of Elephantine, Nsihor, had at first held them back with specious promises; but on learning that Apries was approaching with reinforcements, he attacked them boldly, and driving them before him, hemmed them in between his own force and that of the king and massacred them all.  Apries thought that the revolt at Marea