[Illustration]

As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the French south, the British east-north-east, the wind shifted back to the eastward, allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and knocking the British off to north-north-east (Position 4).  The head of the French column thus passed out of gunshot, across the bows of Rodney’s leading vessel, the Marlborough, (m), which came within range when abreast the eighth ship.  The first shots were fired by the Brave, 74, ninth in the French line, at 8 A.M.  The British captain then put his helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under the lee of the French, towards their rear.  The rest of the British fleet followed in his wake.  The battle thus assumed the form of passing in opposite directions on parallel lines; except that the French ships, as they successively cleared the point where the British column struck their line, would draw out of fire, their course diverging thenceforth from that of the British approach.  The effect of this would be that the British rear, when it reached that point, would be fresh, having undergone no fire, and with that advantage would encounter the French rear, which had received already the fire of the British van and centre.  To obviate this, by bringing his own van into action, de Grasse signalled the van ships to lead south-south-west, parallel with the British north-north-east (4, a).  The engagement thus became general all along the lines; but it is probable that the French van was never well formed.  Its commander, at all events, reached his post later than the commander of the rear did his.[117]

At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for close action, followed immediately by another for the leading ships to head one point to starboard—­towards the enemy—­which indicates that he was not satisfied with the distance first taken by the Marlborough.  The Formidable, his flagship, eighteenth in the column, began to fire at 8.23;[118] but the Barfleur, Hood’s flagship, which was thirty-first, not till 9.25.  This difference in time is to be accounted for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrasted with the fresh trades in the open channel to the northward, which the leading British vessels felt before their rear.  De Grasse now, too late, had realised the disastrous effect which this would have upon his fleet.  If he escaped all else, his ships, baffled by calms and catspaws while the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage, and with it the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chief preoccupation.  Twice he signalled to wear,—­first, all together, then in succession,—­but, although the signals were seen, they could not be obeyed with the enemy close under the lee.  “The French fleet,” comments Chevalier justly, “had freedom of movement no longer.  A fleet cannot wear with an enemy’s fleet within musket-range to leeward.”