The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.

The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 351 pages of information about The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.
very favourable for gaining to windward,—­to the eastward,—­doubtless led to the annulling of the signal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made, and the substitution for it of the line of battle ahead at one cable.  It is to be inferred that Rodney’s first purpose was to tack together, thus restoring Hood to the van, his natural station; but the accident of the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van—­regularly the rear—­most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack in succession, instead of all together, preserving to the full the opportunity which chance had extended for reaching the enemy.  In the engagement, therefore, Hood commanded in the rear, and Rear-Admiral Drake in the van.  The wind with the French seems to have been more to the eastward than with the British,—­not an unusual circumstance in the neighbourhood of land.

As Rodney, notwithstanding his haste, had formed line from time to time during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order, and his signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed.  The French, on the other hand, were greatly scattered when their Commander-in-Chief, in an impulse of hasty, unbalanced judgment, abandoned his previous cautious policy and hurried them into action.  Some of them were over ten miles to windward of the flagship.  Though they crowded sail to rejoin her, there was not time enough for all to take their stations properly, between daylight and 8 A.M., when the firing began.  “Our line of battle was formed under the fire of musketry,"[116] wrote the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command, who, being in the rear of the fleet on this occasion, and consequently among the last to be engaged, had excellent opportunity for observation.  At the beginning it was in de Grasse’s power to postpone action, until the order should be formed, by holding his wind under short canvas; while the mere sight of his vessels hurrying down for action would have compelled Rodney to call in the ships chasing the Zele, the rescue of which was the sole motive of the French manoeuvre.  Instead of this, the French flagship kept off the wind; which precipitated the collision, while at the same time delaying the preparations needed to sustain it.  To this de Grasse added another fault by forming on the port tack, the contrary to that on which the British were, and standing southerly towards Dominica.  The effect of this was to bring his ships into the calms and baffling winds which cling to the shore-line, thus depriving them of their power of manoeuvre.  His object probably was to confine the engagement to a mere pass-by on opposite tacks, by which in all previous instances the French had thwarted the decisive action that Rodney sought.  Nevertheless, the blunder was evident at once to French eyes.  “What evil genius has inspired the admiral?” exclaimed du Pavillon, Vaudreuil’s flag-captain, who was esteemed one of the best tacticians in France, and who fell in the battle.

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The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.