manner the state of internal war shall cease to exist.  This implies nothing more than the right claimed by every belligerent power, and always exercised by the conqueror—­that of deciding for itself how far the war shall be carried—­what amount of restraint and punishment shall be inflicted—­what terms of peace shall be imposed.  The Constitution of the United States does not seem to contemplate the holding, by the Federal Government, of any State as a conquered and dependent province; but in authorizing it to suppress rebellion, it confers every power necessary to do the work effectually.  It authorizes the use of the whole military means of the Government, to be applied in the most unrestricted manner, for the destruction of the rebellious power.  If a State be in rebellion, then the State itself may be held and restrained by military power, so long as may be necessary, in order to secure its obedience to the Federal laws and the due performance of its constitutional obligations.  It would be contradictory and wholly destructive of the right of suppressing rebellion by military power, to admit the irreconcilable right of the State unconditionally to assume its place in the Union, only to renew the war at its own pleasure.  Acting in good faith, the Federal Government has the undoubted right to provide for its own security, and to follow its military measures with all those supplementary proceedings which are usual and appropriate to this end.  This principle surely cannot be questioned; and if so, it involves everything, leaving the question one only of practical expediency and of good faith in the choice of means.

But it is said there is and indeed can be no war between the Government and any of the States; but only between the former, and certain rebellious individuals in the States.  We are well aware that in the ordinary operation of the Federal Government, it acts directly on individuals and not on States.  The cause of this arrangement and its purpose are well understood.  But in case of war or insurrection, the power must be coextensive with the emergency which calls it forth.  If States are actually in rebellion, then of necessity the Government must treat that fact according to its real nature.  The fiction of supposing the State to be loyal when its citizens are all traitors, and of considering it incapable of insurrection when all its authorities are notoriously in open rebellion, would be not less pernicious in its folly and imbecility than it would be absurd to the common sense of mankind.  Undoubtedly it may be true in some instances, that the rebellion has usurped authority in the States.  The will of the people may have been utterly disregarded, and set aside by violence or fraud.  The insurrectionary government of the State may be only the government de facto and not de jure, using these terms with reference only to the State and its people, and not with reference to the paramount authority of the Union which, under all circumstances, deprives