end intended to be accomplished.  Neither the legislative nor the executive department of the Government could legitimately undertake to destroy or change the Constitution, from which both derive their existence and all their lawful power.  It is true that pending a war, either foreign or civil, the Constitution itself confers extraordinary powers upon the Government—­powers far transcending those which it may properly exercise in time of peace.  These war powers, however, great as they are, and limited only by the laws of and usages civilized nations, are not extra-constitutional; they are expressly conferred, and are quite as legitimate as those more moderate ones which appropriately belong to the Government in ordinary times.  But when there is no longer any war—­when the Government shall have succeeded in completely suppressing the rebellion—­what then will be the proper principle of action?  Will not the Constitution of itself, by the simple force of its own terms, revert to its ordinary operation, and spread its benign protection over every part of the country?  Will not all the States, returning to their allegiance, be entitled to hold their place in the Union, upon the same footing which they held prior to the fatal attempt at secession?  These are indeed momentous questions, demanding a speedy solution.

If we say that the Federal Government may put the States upon any different footing than that established by the existing Constitution, then we virtually abrogate that instrument which accurately prescribes the means by which alone its provisions can be altered or amended.  But, on the other hand, if we concede the right of each State, after making war on the Union until it is finally conquered, quietly to return and take its place again with all the rights and privileges it held before, just as if nothing had happened in the interim, then, indeed, do we make of the Federal Government a veritable temple of discord.  We subject it to the danger of perpetual convulsions, without the power to protect itself except by the repetition of sanguinary wars, whenever the caprice or ambition of any State might lead her into the experiment of rebellion.  Between these two unreasonable and contradictory alternatives—­the right of the Government to change its forms, and the right of the rebellious State to assume its place in the union without conditions—­there must be some middle ground upon which both parties may stand securely without doing violence to any constitutional principle.  The Federal Government is clothed with power, and has imposed upon it the duty, to conquer the rebellion.  This is an axiom in the political philosophy of every true Union man, and we therefore do not stop to argue a point disputed only by the enemies of our cause.  But if the Government has power to conquer the domestic enemy in arms against it, then, as a necessary consequence, it must be the sole judge as to when the conquest has been accomplished; in other words, it must pronounce when and in what