[Footnote 396:  Sa/m/skara iti, tanmate purvaksha/n/a eva hetubhuta/h/ sa/m/skaro vasaneti ka vyavahriyate karya/m/ tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya sa/m/skara/h/, tatha ka karyakara/n/atmaka/m/ sarva/m/ bhavarupa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/n/artha/h/.  Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.]

[Footnote 397:  As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.]

[Footnote 398:  I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.—­Viparita iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/adina/m/ yuktya sadhyamanoku/s/alair avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sukshmo vina/s/opratisa/m/khyanirodha/h/.  Brahmav.]

[Footnote 399:  A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it.  In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp.  Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha).  And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

[Footnote 400:  Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.—­Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.]

[Footnote 401:  The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

[Footnote 402:  What does enable us to declare that there is avara/n/abhava in one place and not in another?  Space; which therefore is something real.]

[Footnote 403:  If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is capable.—­Cp. on this point the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 404:  This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.]

[Footnote 405:  According to the vij/n/anavadin the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is mana, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramat/ri/, knowing subject.]

[Footnote 406:  If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.]

[Footnote 407:  Avayavavayavirupo vahyosrtho nasti ken ma bhud jativyaktyadirupas tu syad ity a/s/rankyaha evam iti.  Jatyadina/m/ vyaktyadinam katyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasa@ngad atyantabhinnatve tadvadevatadbhavad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhedavaj gativyaktyadibhedosxpi nastity artha/h/.]