[Footnote 329:  I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.]

[Footnote 330:  T/ri/tiyes’pi katipaya/s/abdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir va bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti/h/ syad iti manvano dvitiya/m/ pratyaha ubhayarthateti.  An.  Gi.]

[Footnote 331:  The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sa/m/saranu/kkh/edat; the Bhamati’s reading is:  Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edat.]

[Footnote 332:  On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana’s activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul’s enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333:  Anantaro dosho mahadadikaryotpadayoga/h/.  An.  Gi.]

[Footnote 334:  In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335:  Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, aha@nkara, and manas.]

[Footnote 336:  Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout.  As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.—­The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.]

[Footnote 337:  In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338:  ‘Artha,’ a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.]

[Footnote 339:  In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340:  In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.]

[Footnote 341:  And that would be against the Sa@nkhya dogma of the soul’s essential purity.]

[Footnote 342:  So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343:  Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti sa@nkate sattveti.  An.  Gi.]

[Footnote 344:  For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.]

[Footnote 345:  The Sa@nkhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.—­The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sa@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346:  Not only ‘suffering as it were,’ as it had been called above.]