or hundred, or thousand, &c.  Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms ‘conjunction’ or ‘inherence’ which however do not prove themselves to be separate entities.—­Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception.—­Nor, again[377], does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion’s permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.

Further[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts.  If the Vai/s/eshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things—­whether contradictory to reason or not—­should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions depend on one’s choice only and may be carried to any extent.  If we once allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the Vai/s/eshikas.  Anybody might then assume anything, and we could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.

Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish[379].

Let it then be said (the Vai/s/eshika resumes) that the samavaya relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode—­which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance—­is not possible.—­That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness can be established.  For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness