of the threads, such as white colour, &c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities.  But this doctrine is clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being non-separate in place.—­If, in the second place, you explain ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be ayutasiddha.—­And if, finally, you explain it to mean ’non-separation in character,’ it is impossible to make any further distinction between the substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being identical with substance.

Moreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/eshikas make between conjunction (sa/m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist separately, and inherence (samavaya) as being the connexion of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence.  Perhaps the Vai/s/eshika will say that his definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence.  But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be connected with the cause.  And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if the Vai/s/eshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375] And[376] just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the connexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.—­although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance—­so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavaya.

Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or sa/m/yoga, apart from the things which it connects.  If it should be maintained that sa/m/yoga and samavaya have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it.  Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahma/n/a learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c.  So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten,