We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.—­That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being.  For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does.  To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction.  But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else.  From this it would follow that the sentence, ’the jar is originated’ means as much as ’the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated[299].’  But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in existence.—­Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.—­How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else?  A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things.  To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things.  If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, ’The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Pur/n/avarman’ the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king.  If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent.  But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never be.—­But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether purposeless.  For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished