In what manner again do you—­who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation—­assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material parts of which it consists?  Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?—­If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.—­Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts[296].—­In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you.  For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath.  But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain given parts we should always have to assume further parts[297].—­Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.—­That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in Srughna and in Pa/t/aliputra on one and the same day.  If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj/n/adatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at Srughna and the other at Pa/t/aliputra.—­If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.  If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.  But such things are not seen to take place.