In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the native forces, had penetrated so near the army of Napoleon, that retreat became exceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of being lost.  The English army was at this time very deficient in engineer troops, and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones.  In order to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the French, the commander-in-chief, says Napier, “directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want of miners and miner’s tools] failed of success in every attempt.”

In Soult’s retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at Oporto, and destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of Wellington.  But while Soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard the river with proper vigilance, Wellington collected boats at different points, crossed over his army, surprised the French, and, had it not been for the singular delay and indecision of General Murray, would most certainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was, his operation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected the safety of Beresford’s corps.  Soult destroyed his artillery and baggage, and hastily retreated through the mountain passes; but his army was again arrested at the river Cavado, and placed on the very brink of destruction, when the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a passage at the Ponte Nova; the same daring officer opened, on the same day, a way for the further escape of the French across the Misarella by the Saltador.

In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to the English to cross the Guadiana, and attack the French before Badajos could be put in a state of defence.  Beresford was directed by Wellington to pass this river at Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to furnish pontons; but they neglected to fulfil their engagement, and the army had to wait till Capt.  Squire, an able and efficient officer of engineers, could construct other means for effecting a passage.  Every thing was done that genius could devise and industry execute; nevertheless, the operations of the army were greatly delayed—­“a delay,” says the historian, “that may be considered as the principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington more than a year on the frontiers of Portugal.”

We might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the Ceira and Alva, and their influence on the pursuit of Massena; Wellington’s passage of the Tagus, and his retreat from Burgos in 1812; the passage of the Adour and Garonne in 1814; and the failure of the mines to blow up the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of examples, it is believed, has already been adduced to show the advantage of maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers, miners, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such troops, as a component part of an army organization.