consequences that would result to the French from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into consideration, Jomini pronounced it “one of the most hazardous and difficult of all the operations of War.”  Here the fate of the army depended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them.  When the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and even fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition.  So skilfully were these operations conducted, that Napoleon’s immense army crossed over in safety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day fought the memorable battle of Esling.  Forced to retire before numbers vastly superior to his own, Napoleon concentrated his forces on the island of Lobau, and intrenched his position.  Surrounded by the broad and deep channel of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful enemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest good fortune to effect a passage.  Here the skill and efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown across the river in the face of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost insurmountable; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon put the finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign.  So high an estimate did Napoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the passage was completed, he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing engineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the French corps du genie.

On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from the Beresina to the left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country, the French derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escaping through their means from the grasp of their pursuers.  When, however, the disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army, and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses.  Of this character we may mention the passage of the Elster by the bridge of Lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those charged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of this small river.  So sensibly did Napoleon feel this want of bridge equipages, in the winter of 1813-14, that he addressed to his minister of war, on this subject, the following remarkable words:  “If I had had pontons, I should have already annihilated the army of Schwartzenberg, and closed the war; I should have taken from him eight or ten thousand wagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper means I could not pass the Seine.”  Again, on the 2d of March he wrote:  “If I had had a bridge equipage this morning, Bluecher’s army had been lost.”  Whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of the full force of these remarks.