here remark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an important victory; 2d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in great peril, and the operation had nearly failed; 3d, if the Prince of Baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of Villars, this single bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces; 4th, the skill of the little corps of French pontoniers saved the bridge, and of consequence, the army.]

In 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that the boats of the bridges across the Wahal and the Rhine were disposed of for commercial purposes; and in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, “the conquerors of Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a time too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means of crossing a river.”  A few boats were procured from the Wahal and the Meuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the Moselle; but “these operations consumed precious time, and four months thus passed away in preparations.”  Even after other things were all ready, the army was obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges; during this delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage.

In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the French collected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the Rhine at Neuweid and Kehl without loss or delay.  The latter of these passages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, and certainly does credit to the general who directed it.  But Moreau’s bridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing a new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all private boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the river.  The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of no further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in the open day, and in face of the enemy.  Undertaken under such circumstances, “the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time very doubtful;” and had it failed, “Moreau’s army would have been ruined for the campaign.”

Napoleon’s celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, shows plainly how important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers.  “I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy time to prevent it.  But the Po, which is a river as wide and deep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome.  We had no means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves with the means of embarkation found at Placentia and its environs.  Lannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the advanced guard.  The Austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and these were easily overcome.  The passage was now continued without interruption, but very slowly. If I had had a good ponton-equipage, the fate of the enemy’s army had been sealed; but the necessity of passing the river by successive embarkations saved it."