remarks on this retreat, “who, from the beginning of the campaign, had made all the arrangements for the equipment and construction of military bridges, was specially charged with the important duty of providing for the passage of this river; and he discharged that duty with a degree of forecast and ability to which certainly Napoleon owed his escape and the wreck of his army its safety.  General Eble had begun to prepare, at Smolensko, for the difficulties which he foresaw in this operation.  He formed, with every care, a train sufficient for the transport of all the tools and stores that might be required; and, further to provide against casualties and accidents, every man belonging to the companies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from Smolensko a tool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of nails:  and fortunate was it for the army that he did so; for such was the difficulty in getting through the carriages containing stores, that only two forge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved.  To these the general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of carriages that were abandoned on the march.  Much was sacrificed to bring off these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, as Segur observes, that exertion ‘sauva l’armee.’”

But it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most likely to appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resulting from the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its importance and the advantages to be derived from its possession.  A few examples of this nature, drawn from military history, may be instructive.  We need not go back to the disastrous passage of the Vistula by Charles XII., the failure of Marlborough to pass the Dyle, and Eugene to cross the Adda in 1705, nor of the three unsuccessful attempts of Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743.  The wars following the French Revolution are sufficiently replete with useful instruction on this subject.[39]

[Footnote 39:  Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one example, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702.  It was deemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince of Baden in his camp at Friedlingen.  Accordingly, a bridge was thrown across the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victory gained.  But Villars was several times on the point of losing all for want of a sufficient ponton equipage.  Having but a single bridge, the passage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder ensued, and the whole movement was retarded; Villars could bring only a small part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of the battle the infantry were in want of ammunition:  moreover, the whole operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy this bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers saved it.  We