“The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a more glorious sphere—­that of the offensive.  In our last war, instead of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy’s vessels in watch over them than their own number—­instead of leaving the enemy’s commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy’s navigation.  And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy’s property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal—­they rendered benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.  Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement.  In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence.”

A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy of their support, and we will close this discussion.  We do not regard this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence.  No matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be substituted for the other.  There are some few cases, however, where this might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive.  Let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning.  For the defence of New York city, the Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in this case, be substituted.  But let us suppose that the outer harbor of New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them.  This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important.  Strong fortifications on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer