by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary in both passages.  Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved the memorable victory of the Nile.  When we consider the narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic.”

“The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe; his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle—­these are instances, of the many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances.  For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron.  When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt.  Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz.”

“On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible.  It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible.  The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed.  On an element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness.”

“Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or reserve beyond.”