from the battery of Amack.  A part of the fleet remained as a reserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced to the King’s Channel.  This attacking force consisted of eight ships of the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred guns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is not given.) One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into action, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson says, “although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great service.”  This force was concentrated upon a part of the Danish line of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the reach of succor, and without a chance of escape.  The result was what might have been expected.  Every vessel of the right and centre of this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones, which cut and run under protection of the fortifications.  The left of the line, being supported by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken.  A division of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but “it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was obliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off.”

[Footnote 21:  Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the English writers generally say eighty-eight.  A few, (apparently to increase the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still greater.]

The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to the city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest.  They are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the British ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force.  Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance far enough to be within their range.

The Crown-battery was behind the Danish line, and mainly masked by it.  A part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this line, and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates, which it did most effectually.  But we now come to a new feature in this battle.  As the Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the English, the range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and its power was felt.  Nelson saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last convinced of the prudence of the admiral’s signal for retreat, “made up his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement.”  To retreat, however, from his present position, was exceedingly difficult and dangerous.  He therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent: 

“Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the power to save the brave Danes who have defended them.”