On this passage, we remark:—­

1st.  The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the Sound amounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over seventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one, the British admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries.

2d.  By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of England, he persuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore, out of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore.

3d.  It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that if the Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the Danish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any serious attempt on Copenhagen.

We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen itself.  The only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow approach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35) On the most advanced part of this shoal are the Crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eight guns.[21] The entrance into the Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthorn, is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which is situated directly opposite Copenhagen.  To defend the entrance on the left of the Crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel four ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all three hundred and fifty-eight guns.  To secure the port and city from bombardment from the King’s Channel, (that between the Middle Ground and town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the shoal, and manned principally by volunteers.  This line consisted of old hulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six hundred and twenty-eight guns—­a force strong enough to prevent the approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of war; but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the difficulties of navigation.  These difficulties were certainly very great; and Nelson said, beforehand, that “the wind which might carry him in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship.”  Had the Danes supposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, the line of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the right supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack.  “In that case,” says Napoleon, “it is probable that Nelson would have failed in his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between the line and shore thus lined with cannon.”  As it was, the line was too extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive assistance