eius modi, altered by Dav. Recte ... additum:  the semicolon at Arcesilas was added by Manutius, who is followed by all edd.  This involves taking additum = additum est, an ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. Opusc. I. 448, D.F. I. 43, Gram. 479 a.  I think it quite possible that recte consensit additum should be construed together, “agreed that the addition had been rightly made.”  For the omission of esse in that case cf.  Madv. Gram. 406, and such expressions as dicere solebat perturbatum in 111, also ita scribenti exanclatum in 108. Recte, which with the ordinary stopping expresses Cic.’s needless approval of Arcesilas’ conduct would thus gain in point.  Qy, should concessit be read, as in 118 concessisse is now read for MSS. consensisse? A vero:  cf. 41.

Sec.78. Quae adhuc permanserit:  note the subj., “which is of such a nature as to have lasted”. Nam illud ... pertinebat:  by illud is meant the argument in defence of [Greek:  epoche] given in 67; by nihil ... pertinebat nothing more is intended than that there was no immediate or close connection.  Cf. the use of pertinere in D.F. III. 55. Clitomacho:  cf. n. on 59.

Sec.Sec.79—­90.  Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses.  You are thus acting like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80).  I wish the god of whom you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound senses.  He would have a bad time with me.  For even granting that our vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is!  But say you, we desire no more.  No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not the light because he is blind.  Yet I would not so much reproach the god because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81).  If you want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the sun?  Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a little broader or narrower than he seems.  With all his enormous speed, too, he appears to us to stand still (82).  The whole question lies in a nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a false one indistinguishable from it (83).  A man who has mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta.  You say that no such indistinguishable resemblances exist.  Never mind, they seem to exist and that is enough.  One mistaken sensation will throw all the others into uncertainty (84).  You say everything belongs to its own genus this I will not contest.  I am not concerned to show that two sensations are absolutely