cf. n. on 33. Nihil ut esset:  the ut here is a repetition of the ut used several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend on sic.  Lamb. expunged ut before esset and before quicquam. Intestinum et oblatum:  cf.  Sext. A.M. VII. 241 [Greek:  etoi ton ektos e ton en hemin pathon], and the two classes of falsa visa mentioned in n. on 47. Sin autem sunt, etc.:  if there are false sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true?  The rest exactly as in 47.

Sec.Sec.49—­53.  Antiochus attacked these arguments as soritae, and therefore faulty (49).  The admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50).  We contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require before giving assent.  When we have wakened from the dream, we make light of the sensations we had while in it (51).  But, say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our waking ones.  This we deny (52).  “But,” say they, “you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent.”  This proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life.  All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).

Sec.49. Antiochus:  Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and similar subjects. Ipsa capita:  [Greek:  auta ta kephalaia]. Interrogationis:  the sorites was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. De Div. II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his proposed trans. acervalis is unnecessary), Hortens. fragm. 47, and n. on 92. Hoc vocant:  i.e. hoc genus, cf. D.F. III. 70 ex eo genere, quae prosunt. Vitiosum:  cf. D.F. IV. 50 ille sorites, quo nihil putatis (Stoici) vitiosius.  Most edd. read hos, which indeed in 136 is a necessary em. for MSS. hoc. Tale visum:  i.e. falsum. Dormienti:  sc. [Greek:  tini]. Ut probabile sit, etc.:  cf. 47, 48 and notes. Primum quidque:  not quodque as Klotz; cf. M.D.F. II. 105, to whose exx. add De Div. II. 112, and an instance of proximus quisque in De Off. II. 75. Vitium:  cf. vitiosum above.

Sec.50. Omnia deum posse:  this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at least, see De Div. II. 86.  For the line of argument here cf. De Div. II. 106 fac dare deos, quod absurdum est. Eadem:  this does not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on 40. Similes:  after this sunt was added by Madv. In suo genere essent:  substitute esse viderentur for essent, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would allow that things in their essence are divisible into sharply-defined genera, but would deny that the sensations which proceed from or are caused by the things, are so divisible.