Most Illustrious Sir,

In addition to my official letters of the 3rd and 4th inst.  I beg to acquaint you that, being convinced—­not only from the conduct of the crew of this ship during the attack on the 4th, but from what I observed in regard to the other vessels—­that nothing beneficial to His Imperial Majesty’s service could be effected by any attempts to combine the whole squadron in an attack against the enemy—­but, on the contrary, from the imperfect and incongruous manner in which the vessels are manned—­ consequences of the most serious nature would ensue from any further attempt of the kind.  I have therefore determined to take the squadron to Moro San Paulo, for the adoption of other measures essential under such circumstances, viz. to take on board such officers and men from the bad sailing vessels as will render the Pedro Primiero more effective than the whole squadron as now constituted.

In the first conversation I had with you, I gave you my opinion as to the superior benefit of equipping one or two vessels well—­ rather than many imperfectly, and I again beg to press on your consideration the necessity of such efficient equipment of all vessels, whether many or few.  I must also remind you of the great danger that arises from the employment of Portuguese of the inferior class in active operations against their own countrymen, because they neither do nor can consider that the dispute between Brazil and the Portuguese Government, bears any similarity to warfare as ordinarily understood.  I have had sufficient proof since leaving Rio de Janeiro, that there is no more trust to be placed in Portuguese, when employed to fight against their countrymen, than there was in the Spaniards, who, on the opposite side of this continent, betrayed the patriot Governments, by whom they were employed.  I shall press this point no further than to say, that so long as His Imperial Majesty’s ships are so manned, I shall consider them as not only wholly inefficient, but requiring to be vigilantly watched in order to prevent the most dangerous consequences.

Since making my arrangements at the Moro, where I left all the squadron except this ship and the Maria de Gloria, I have been constantly off the port of Bahia, but could see nothing of the enemy’s squadron, till the 20th, when I learned from an English vessel that they had been as far down as the Abrolhos shoals, for what purpose I know not.  They consist of thirteen vessels, being the number which we encountered on the 4th.  I am watching an opportunity to attack them in the night, in the hope not only of being able to damage them materially by the fire of this ship, but also in the expectation that, if they are not better disciplined than the crews of this squadron, they will occasion as much damage amongst themselves, as they would sustain if they had an equal force to contend with.  In the meantime we are as effectually