The blockade of the port was not calculated to effect anything decisive, beyond paralysing the naval operations of the enemy’s squadron.  Even this would not prevent the Portuguese from strengthening themselves in positions on shore, and thus, by intimidating all other districts within reach,—­enable them to bar the progress of independence.  I therefore determined, as a force in our condition was not safe to hazard in any combination requiring prompt and implicit obedience, to adopt the step of which I had apprised the Prime Minister, and took the squadron to Moro San Paulo, where, transferring from the bad sailing frigates to the flagship, the captains, officers, and best petty officers and seamen, the Pedro Primiero was rendered more efficient than the whole together; and with her and the Maria de Gloria, I resolved to conduct further operations against the enemy—­leaving the Piranga, and Nitherohy, together with all the other vessels, in charge of Captain Pio—­the two senior captains having been transferred to the flagship, in charge of their officers and men.

There was, however, another reason for leaving the remainder of the squadron at Moro San Paulo.  Before quitting Rio de Janeiro, I had urged on the Government the necessity of immediately forwarding fireships, as the most reliable means for destroying a superior force.  These had not been supplied; but in their place a quantity of inflammable and explosive materials had been sent.  As several prizes had been taken, I determined to convert them into fireships, as well as the Real schooner—­a useless vessel, the crew of which had shewn that they were not to be depended upon; so that the remaining ships of the squadron, though unreliable in other respects, were well employed in carrying these objects into execution.

In order to protect the ships and men thus engaged, I directed a body of marines to be landed, for the purpose of making a show by forming and manning batteries to repel any attack, though, had such been made, neither the batteries nor their defenders would have been of much service.

The flagship, together with the Maria de Gloria, now proceeded to cruize off Bahia, with such success that all supplies were cut off by sea, notwithstanding repeated attempts to introduce vessels from San Mattheos with farinha—­a dozen of which fell into our hands, in spite of the enemy’s superiority.

As the Carolina had now joined us, I directed her to take under convoy the captured transports with provisions, whilst the Guarani was sent to scour the coast, with orders to avoid approaching the enemy’s fleet, and to bring me information as to the progress of the fireships, upon which I now saw that I must mainly rely.

On the 21st, I considered it expedient to address the following private letter to the Minister of Marine:—­

   Off Bahia, N.W. 12 miles,
   May 21, 1833.