Ulstermen had expected to negotiate on the basis of taking the Home Rule Act as the maximum Nationalist demand.  The only compromise which they had contemplated was a mean term between the provisions of that Act and Ulster’s demand for a continuance of the legislative Union so far as Ulster was concerned.  The second was that Belfast regarded as ruinous to its interests any possibility of a tariff war with Great Britain, and believed that if Ireland were given the power to fix its own customs duties the dominant farming interest would seek to find revenue by new taxation on imports.  Hence, the proposal to give Ireland full fiscal powers could not be acceptable to Ulster.  Here lay the main rock in our course.

As the discussion proceeded, one category of proposals was summarily dealt with—­those which contemplated the setting up of some provincial authority intermediate between the central Parliament, which all postulated, and the existing local bodies in the counties.  This policy did not lack advocates.  But the County Councillors were solid against it:  evidently their private meeting discussed and decided against an expedient which they held would detract from the dignity of the central Parliament and from the dignity of the County Councils.  Those who defended it as a plan which might meet Ulster’s difficulty got no backing from Ulster; that group said neither for nor against it.  In the rest of the assembly there was a strong feeling against anything that looked like partition or might in public be called partition.  Several of us had thought in advance that this was the most likely path to the solution; and looking back, I think it ought to have been much more fully explored.  But encouragement was lacking.

Another anticipation proved illusory.  We all realized that in the circumstances Ireland could come to a financial arrangement with Great Britain on easier terms than at any time in her history; that to settle at once would be highly profitable; and more particularly, that we could probably secure the completion of land purchase as part of the bargain.  It was thought that this argument would appeal to the commercial sense of Ulster.  We were met by a resolute reiteration that Ulster considered it Ulster’s duty and Ireland’s duty to take a full share, equally with the rest of the United Kingdom, in all the consequences of the war—­even if it cost them their last shilling; and Ulster speakers denounced our argument as a bribe.  Some Nationalists were inclined to discount these protestations, yet I see no reason to doubt their sincerity.  At all events, no one disputed that it was to Ireland’s interest financially that a settlement should be made.