To sum up, then, this criticism—­what he said and did publicly in the Convention could hardly by stretch of imagination have been bettered.  But outside its sessions he did not handle his team.  On the balance, probably, he thought it better to leave them to their own devices; but his temperament weighed in that decision.  As a result, the County Councillors and other local representatives used to hold meetings of their own.  They were shrewd and capable men; but in the matters with which we had to deal the most skilled direction was necessary; and there was never a man more capable of giving them guidance out of a lifetime’s experience than was Redmond, nor one from whom they would have more willingly accepted instruction.

Discussion in the Convention itself was not of great value for the education of opinion, because men naturally were reluctant to get up and state precisely their individual difficulties, which in a confidential interchange of views might have been shown to proceed from some defect in comprehension.  The chief value in the debates lay in what they revealed rather than what they imparted.  One fact was salient.  No Nationalist was prepared to recommend acceptance of the Home Rule Act as it stood, though some of its most vehement assailants adopted great parts of its framework.  Broadly speaking, Nationalists wanted for Ireland the powers which were possessed by a self-governing Dominion, but were content to leave all control of defence to the Imperial authority and did not press any demand for a local militia.  On the other hand, there was strong insistence on the right of an Irish Parliament to have complete power of taxation within its jurisdiction.

It was manifest that the financial clauses of the existing Act would no longer apply.  They were framed in view of a situation which found Ireland contributing ten millions in taxation and costing twelve to administer.  Now, less than half the taxation paid the cost of all Irish services and the balance went towards the war.

It was also evident that Nationalists were prepared to make concessions to the minority quite inconsistent with the current democratic view of what a Constitution should be.  The Bishop of Raphoe, for instance, expressed willingness to have the Irish peers as an Upper House.  Lord Midleton, however, for the Southern Unionists, insisted that those whom he spoke for must have a voice in the House of Commons—­however they got it; and there was general desire to give it them, even by methods which no one could justify for general application.

In short, it became increasingly clear as the debates proceeded that we could come to an arrangement with Unionists if Lord Midleton represented Unionism.  But he did not.  Ulster was there; and the Ulster men made it plain that their business was to hear suggestions, not to put them forward.  Two facts, however, emerged about Ulster’s attitude.  The first was that in coming to the Convention the