there is betwixt our happiness or misery, with our obedience, or disobedience, hereunto.  Thus our duty and happiness, can never be divided, but when we prefer a less happiness to a greater; and therein act not conformably to the dictates of our natural desire of happiness, or pleasure; which two Terms differ only in this, that we apply the Term Pleasure to any agreeable Sentiment, or Sensation, how small, or short soever in its duration; but that of Happiness, only to such degrees of pleasure, as do, in some considerable degree, out-ballance our Evils.

That we are many ways capable of receiving pleasure, we experimentally find; every sense furnishes something to delight, and please us, in its Application to Objects suited to a grateful exercise thereof.  And the operations of our own Minds upon the Ideas presented to them by our Senses, afford us also other pleasures, oftentimes preferable by us to those that we receive immediately from Sense.  But be our pleasures excited how they will; or whatsoever they consist in, Those that Men receive from the Gratification of antecedent desire, are the pleasures that they have the strongest relish of. A Good not desir’d, making (comparatively) but a small Impression upon us.

Now the Gratification of their desires is not always in Men’s Power, but oftentimes it is so.  It is then often in their choice to procure to themselves pleasure, or not.  Whence it is reasonable for them to inquire, since happiness consists in pleasure; and the Gratification of their Desires, and Appetites, always gives them pleasure; whether, or no, to Gratifie These should not therefore always be that which should determine their actions in pursuance of this their chief End?

That happiness consisting in pleasure, we are so much the happier as we enjoy more pleasure, must unquestionably, be found true; but that the Gratification of Men’s Desires and Appetites cannot therefore be that which should always, as they are rational Agents, determine, or regulate their actions in pursuit of happiness, is no less evident; in that we perceive our selves, and the Things to which we have relation, to be so fram’d, and constituted, in respect one of another, that the Gratification of our present Desires and Appetites, does sometimes for a short, or small pleasure, procure to us a greater, and more durable Pain:  and that on the contrary, the denial, or restraint of our present Desires, and Appetites, does sometimes for a short, or small Pain, procure to us a greater, or more durable Pleasure.  Since then that we should act contrary to our own end therein, and prefer less pleasure to greater, it is apparent that the Gratification of our present Appetites cannot be that which always, as we are rational Agents, proposing to our selves happiness for our chief end, should determine, or regulate our voluntary actions; present Appetite telling us only what will give us present pleasure; not what will, in the whole, procure to