At the time when the constitution was being drawn I once discussed this point with an astute jurist, who had long been and still is with us in an important position—­Mr. Pape.  He said to me:  “The emperor has no veto.”  I replied, “Constitutionally he has not, but suppose a measure is expected of him which he thinks he should not take, and against which his then chancellor warns him, saying:  I cannot advocate it, and I shall not countersign it.  Well, in this case is the emperor obliged to look for another chancellor, and to dismiss him who opposes the measure?  Is he obliged to accept anyone as chancellor, suggested perhaps by the other party?  Will he look for a second or third chancellor, both of whom may say:  We cannot assume the responsibility for this bill by submitting it to the Reichstag?” Hereupon Mr. Pape replied:  “You are right, the emperor possesses an indirect but actual veto.”

I do not even go so far, for none of these cases are pressed to their logical conclusion.  Let us, however, take a concrete case, which will make these matters perfectly clear.  Suppose the majority of the Bundesrat had passed a bill with the approval of Prussia, but Prussia had made the mistake of not calling upon the Prussian minister designated to instruct the Prussian delegation in the Bundesrat; or even—­Prussia had consented and the minister had been present, and had been in the minority also in the Prussian cabinet, and the emperor had directed him to submit the resolves of the Bundesrat to the Reichstag, to which the chancellor had replied:  “I do not believe that I can answer for this, or that my responsibility permits me to do it.”  Then there results the possibility of the emperor’s saying:  “If that is so, I must look for another chancellor.”  This did not happen; another thing happened, namely—­the resolve was not submitted.  The ensuing situation is this, that the persons entitled to complain—­if there are any—­constitute the majority of the governments who passed this resolve in the Bundesrat.

This points the proper way, and I believe in weighty questions it would be taken to the end.  In the present case if one were to make a test of what is really right, the majority of the Bundesrat would have to represent to His Majesty as follows:  “We have passed a resolve, and our constitutional right demands that the emperor submit it to the Reichstag.  We demand that this be done.”  The emperor might reply:  “I will not investigate the law of the case to see whether I am obliged to act.  I will assume that I am, and I do not refuse to act, but for the present I have no chancellor willing to countersign the order.”  In such a case can the chancellor be ordered to sign, because he shall and must do so?  Can he be threatened with imprisonment as is done with recalcitrant witnesses?  What would then become of his responsibility!  If the chancellor continues to refuse, the majority of the Bundesrat may say to the emperor:  “You