so bad as I am painted.  His attack upon me, moreover, if he will stop to reflect, is largely directed not against me personally, or against that part of my activities in which I possess freedom of action, no—­it is directed primarily against the constitution of the German empire.  The constitution of the German empire knows no other responsible officer but the chancellor.  I might assert that my constitutional responsibility does not go nearly so far as the one actually placed upon me; and I might take things a little easier and say:  “I have nothing to do with the home policies of the empire, for I am only the emperor’s executive officer.”  But I will not do this.  From the beginning I have assumed the responsibility, and also the obligation, of defending the decisions of the Bundesrat, provided I can reconcile them with my responsibility, even if I find myself there in the minority.  This responsibility I will take as public opinion understands it.  Nobody, however, can be held responsible for acts and resolves not his own.  No responsibility can be foisted on anybody—­nor did the imperial constitution intend to do this—­for acts which do not depend on his own free will, and into which he can be forced.  The responsible person, therefore, must enjoy complete independence and freedom within the sphere of his responsibility.  If he does not, all responsibility ceases; and I do not know on whose shoulders it will rest—­so far as the empire is concerned it has disappeared completely.

As long, therefore, as Mr. Richter does not change the constitution, you yourselves must insist on having a chancellor who is absolutely free and independent in his decisions, for no man can hold him responsible for those things which he is unable to decide for himself, freely and independently.  Mr. Richter has expressed the wish of limiting in several directions this constitutional independence of the chancellor.  In the first place, in one direction where it is already limited and where he wishes to have it disappear entirely.  This concerns his responsibility for those acts in our political life which the constitution assigns to the emperor in connection with the decisions of the Bundesrat and the Reichstag.  There can be no doubt that these acts include also those which have to be performed, as the constitution says, in the name of the emperor; the submission, for instance, to the Reichstag of a resolve of the Bundesrat.  Mr. Richter has correctly quoted an incident, mentioned in the North German Gazette, concerning the resolves on some collected cases of accidents, which I considered it incompatible with my responsibility to submit to you in the name of the emperor.  I, therefore, did not do it.  One may well ask:  What has the constitutional law to say on this point?  Was I justified in not acting?  Was the emperor justified in not acting!  Or was His Majesty the Emperor bound by the constitution to submit to you the resolve of the Bundesrat?